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SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
[T]his 15 member Council acts on behalf of a total of [188] Mem-
ber States of the United Nations. This means that [1731 States
have placed their security, and possibly their very survival, in the
hands of fifteen. This is a solemn and heavy responsibility that
each and every member of the Council carries. It is therefore of
crucial importance that every decision taken by the Security
Council be able to withstand the careful scrutiny of the [173]
Member States on whose behalf the Council is expected to act.'
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the United Nations Charter ("Charter"), the
Security Council of the United Nations ("Security Council") is
designed to act on behalf of the entire U.N. membership. Arti-
cle 24 of the Charter provides, "In order to ensure prompt and
effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts
on their behalf."2 Despite this mandate, at the turn of the cen-
tury, the Security Council remains unrepresentative of the U.N.
membership. The Charter also provides that "[tihe Organiza-
tion is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Member States and equal rights should be afforded to nations
large and small."3 This fundamental principle of equality for all
Member States has never been adopted in practice. The reality
is that due to the disparity in power created by the Security
Council, Member States are far from being equal.
Several factors contribute to this inequality. Numerically
speaking, the current U.N. membership includes 188 Member
States from every region of the world, while there are only fif-
teen Member States on the Security Council. 4 At the time of
the signing of the Charter, only eleven of the fifty-one original
Member States were on the Security Council. At its formation,
therefore, the proportion of Security Council Members to the to-
1 U.N. Doc. S/PV.3063, at 54-55 (1992) (statement by Mr. Mumbengegwi,
representative of Zimbabwe).
2 U.N. CHARTER art. 24 (emphasis added).
3 Id. at art. 2.
4 See http://www.un.org. The membership of Tuvalu is currently being re-
viewed and may increase the overall membership of the U.N. to 189. See id.
20001
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tal Member States was greater than twenty percent. 5 Today, it
is less than eight percent. 6 A second factor causing a lack of
representation is the continuing domination of the Security
Council by its Permanent Members, a domination collectively
aided by the shared power of veto. In addition, all Security
Council Members generally act in their own self-interest. Fi-
nally, the overall working methods of the Security Council do
not allow the participation of pertinent non-Security Council
members and their methods lack transparency.
All U.N. Member States and the international community
agree on the need to reform the Security Council in order to re-
flect the modern world structure and to represent all Member
States. 7 The difficulty lies in deciding what exact measures
need to be implemented to assure the equality, representation,
transparency, and effectiveness of the Security Council. The
main issues surrounding reform of the Security Council include
the following: whether its membership should be expanded and,
if so, whether the number of both the non-permanent members
and the Permanent Members should be expanded; whether the
veto power should be abolished, limited, expanded, or modified;
whether the non-members of the Security Council should be af-
forded greater participation in Security Council decisions; and
whether Security Council proceedings should be more transpar-
ent. The Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equi-
5 See DocuMENTs ON REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 434 (Paul Taylor &
Sam Daws eds., Dartmouth Publishing 1997) (citing Reform of the Security Coun-
cil: Memorandum Submitted to the President of the U.N. General Assembly, Inter-
national Peace Academy and The Stanley Foundation, 20 May 1994) [hereinafter
DocuMENTs ON REFORM].
6 See id. The increase in Member States is a result of the fact that at the
time of the signing of the Charter many Members did not exist as sovereign States.
Now these States are in the majority. Decolonization and other circumstances led
to the independence of newly formed States, which subsequently became Member
States of the United Nations. See BASic FACTS ABoUT THE UNITED NATIONS 293
(U.N. Pub. 1998).
7 See Assembly President Opens Debate on Security Council, U.N. Doc. GA/
SM/143 (1999) (statement of the then-President of the General Assembly, Theo-
Ben Gurirab:
It goes without saying that all of us agree on the need to reform and en-
large the Security Council in all respects, in order for this vital United
Nations organ to reflect the changes of the modern world and be respon-
sive to the wishes of all the United Nations Member States in the spirit of
equality and justice.
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table Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the
Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security
Council ("Working Group") was created in 1993 to address these
specific issues and to propose reform measures for the Security
Council in general. Yet, in the seven years since its establish-
ment, the Working Group has failed to pass any substantive
resolutions.8
This article will discuss the problems of the Security Coun-
cil that have resulted in a lack of representation and equality
for U.N. Member States including the domination of the Secur-
ity Council, with particular attention to domination by the Se-
curity Council's Permanent Members. This article will also
present possible solutions to these problems. Although many
argue that the Security Council is finally doing what it was
originally intended to do, the purpose of this paper is not to ar-
gue that the Security Council should decrease its activities.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that if and when
the Security Council decides to act, it must do so according to
principles of equality and representation, fundamental ideals of
the United Nations. Part II contains a brief overview of the Se-
curity Council's background, functions, powers, and procedures.
Part III discusses both the existing problems of the Security
Council which led to calls for reform, and the obstacles that may
block such measures. Part IV provides various suggestions pro-
posed by Member States, regional groups, the Working Group
and the author's own proposals. Part V contains a conclusion
with a summary of the proposals.
8 See Security Council Reform Should Aim at Enhancing Relevance of the
United Nations, Assembly President Says, U.N. Doc. GA/SM/55/SC.6563 (1998).
Five years after its formation the then-President of the General Assembly and also
Chairman of the Working Group stated:
While progress has been made in some areas and new ideas and proposals
have emerged, at this point there is no compelling evidence to believe that
the meetings of the Working Group have yielded a breakthrough in this
reform exercise. Moreover, once again the Working Group appeared to be
not in a position to submit any agreed recommendations on the substance
of this matter to the General Assembly, except that it should continue its
work during the next session.
Assembly Adopts Text on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Takes Up Security Council Re-
form U.N. Doc. GA/9688 (1999).
2000]
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
An overview of the Security Council is necessary to demon-
strate how the Security Council's functions, powers and proce-
dures inherently result in inequality and under-representation
of U.N. Member States. The background also illustrates that
the manner in which the Security Council was formed created
the same problems that have lingered until the present day.
A. Background of the Security Council
In the wake of World War II, the victorious nations, China,
France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States ("Five
Powers") agreed to form the United Nations to replace the de-
funct League of Nations.9 During initial negotiations, one of the
main debates centered on how to design a Security Council that
would ensure member representation and equality through its
composition and voting procedures.10 Numerous concerns were
raised about what appeared to be an overabundance of power
given to the Security Council, particularly to its Permanent
Members. Smaller States feared that the greater powers would
unite and impose their will upon them.11 The Five Powers
counter-argued that they could not act alone because a certain
number of the non-Permanent Members would be required to
agree to any resolutions.12 Realizing that the United Nations
would not come into existence without meeting the demands of
the Five Powers, debates subsided and all other States suc-
cumbed to the terms of the Five Powers without having their
concerns seriously addressed. With the signing of the U.N.
Charter in 1945, the Five Powers became the five Permanent
Members of the Security Council, and were bestowed with enor-
mous power.
9 See ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE U.N. IN OR OUT? 60
(1987). Besides being the victors of the war, three of these five could not be consid-
ered truly powerfujl. The United Kingdom was economically exhausted. France
had numerous internal problems including the recovery from wartime occupation
and the Vichy. China was soon engaged in its own civil war. See EDWARD MC-
WHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING 88 (1984) (discussing in depth the lack of
power of these countries).
10 See DOCUMENTS ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 415.
11 See SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECUR-
ITY COUNCIL 139 (3d ed., 1998).
12 See id.
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In the four decades following the signing of the Charter, the
East-West political divide had a crucial impact on the function-
ing of the Security Council. It was often frustrated by its inabil-
ity to act quickly and effectively against perceived threats to
peace. The collapse of the "Iron Curtain" marked a decline in
this East-West tension and resulted in an incredible transfor-
mation of the Security Council, thus ending its previous stale-
mate. No longer paralyzed by superpower vetoes, the Security
Council displayed an unprecedented activism in the 1990's, in-
cluding the assumption of a key role in the Gulf War. Of the
fifty-three operations that the Security Council has undertaken
since 1948, forty have been initiated between the years of 1988
and 2000.13 As of February 1, 2000, seventeen operations were
under way. 14
B. The Security Council's Functions, Powers and Procedures
The Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of
international peace and security. 15 The Security Council can
make recommendations either to individual parties in a dispute
or to the General Assembly as a whole. It can also render bind-
ing resolutions on any or all U.N. Member States. Member
States are obligated to follow these binding resolutions in accor-
dance with the Charter which states that Member States must
"accept and carry out" its decisions. 16 No other organ of the
United Nations has such binding, mandatory authority. 17
13 See http-J/www.un.org/Depts/dpko.
14 See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko. (The following are the current opera-
tions with each starting date: U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic
(MINURCA) (April 1998); U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUC) (Nov. 1999); U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
(Oct. 1999); U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
(April 1991); U.N. Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) (Dec. 1997); U.N.
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (Oct. 1999); U.N. Military
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) (Jan. 1949); U.N. Mission of
Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) (Dec. 1994); U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (UNMIBH)(Dec. 1995); U.N. Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)
(Jan. 1996); U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)(March 1964); U.N.
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) (Aug. 1993); U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Ju&ne 1999)).
15 See U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
16 See id. at art. 25.
17 BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 6, at 9.
2000]
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The Security Council also has the power to investigate any
situation that could lead to international friction or dispute.18
After investigating, the Security Council may determine the ex-
istence of any threat to peace and may take measures to resolve
the problem. Such measures include provisional measures,
non-military orders such as the regulation of armaments, and
economic sanctions. 19 If these are insufficient, the Security
Council may then order peacekeeping missions or enforcement
actions against a State that is threatening the maintenance of
peace.20 These two methods should not be confused.
21
Peacekeeping missions are traditionally carried out with the
consent of the disputing parties and peacekeepers are deployed
to implement an agreement approved by the parties. 22 With en-
forcement actions, the Security Council gives Member States
the authority to take all necessary means to achieve an objec-
tive, and consent of the parties is not required.23 The Security
Council authorized such enforcement actions in the Gulf War,
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Alba-
nia.24 While the Security Council approved these enforcement
operations, a single country or group of countries undertook the
actual actions. When these authorizations are rendered, the
Security Council normally does not have control over the
actions .25
18 See U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
19 See id. at art. 39.
20 See U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Article 42 provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Arti-
cle 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demon-
strations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.
21 See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko.
22 See id.
23 See id. See also John Quigley, The "Privatization" of Security Council En-
forcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 249 (1996) (dis-
cussing the Security Council's resort to "privatization" of armed forces instead of
carrying out military actions itself).
24 See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko.
25 See generally Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Per-
sian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 526-27
(1991) (stating that the lack of control by the Council under the Iraq resolution
was "not what the U.N. founders and Charter drafters had in mind."); Malvina
Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes Action, 17
[Vol. 12:319
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Beyond these powers and functions, the general procedures
of the Security Council have often been called into controversy.
The Charter provides that the Security Council can establish its
own rule of procedures. 26 Procedures for voting are one of its
most controversial aspects. Any Security Council Member may
submit a proposal to be voted upon.27 U.N. Member States can
also submit proposals, but before any vote on such a proposal is
considered, a member of the Security Council must request it be
considered. 28 All members of the Security Council receive one
vote.29 Passing a resolution requires an affirmative vote of nine
Members, including the concurring votes of all Permanent
Members. The requirement that all Permanent Members must
concur is the source of their veto power.30
Abstentions, the "hidden veto," and absences also effect the
voting of the Security Council. Voluntary abstentions are per-
mitted,31 and Members who are parties to disputes are required
to abstain from voting.32 The "hidden vote" exists in a situation
where an insufficient number of Members vote, and the propo-
sal is automatically rejected.33 When Members can be per-
suaded to refrain from voting, proposals may be defeated.3 4
Absences, either voluntary or involuntary, have also been used
to affect outcomes. 35
MICH. J. INT'L L. 229 (1996) (discussing whether self-defense is permissible once
the Security Council has acted).
26 See U.N. CHARTER art. 30.
27 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 221.
28 See id.
29 See U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
30 See id. In only one instance is the veto power not allowed. In the election of
judges to the International Court of Justice, the Security Council vote is to be
taken "without any distinction between permanent and non-Permanent Members
of the Security Council." Id. at art. 10. See also Study on the Legal Basis of the
veto: letter dated 11 August 1997 from the Under-Secretary-General for General
Assembly Affairs and Conference Services Addressed to the Vice-Chairman of the
Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/AC/247/1998/CRP.1 (1998), revised by U.N. Doc. A/52/
47/ANNEX12 (1999).
31 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 250.
32 See U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
33 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 249.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 257. The Soviet Union boycotted votes on several occasions. It
boycotted five meetings regarding an Iranian complaint in 1946. It also boycotted
meetings in protest of the Council failing to replace the representative of National-
ist China with representative of the People's Republic of China after the Chinese
2000]
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Although this overview has attempted to present the Secur-
ity Council's functions, powers and procedures in a neutral way,
it is evident from its formation and founding principles that the
Security Council does not provide equality or representation to
U.N. Member States. Considering these problems and con-
cerns, the need to reform has been pushed to the forefront of the
United Nations' agenda.
III. REFORMING THE SECURITY COUNCIL
A. Renewed Calls to Reform the Security Council
Dissatisfaction with the Security Council surfaced during
its own formation negotiations. 36 The discontent failed to sub-
side and the issue of reformation of the Security Council was
finally put on the General Assembly's agenda in 1979. It was
not until 1991, however, that the topic was formally dis-
cussed.3 7 The focus during the 1990's on reforms of the Security
Council was partly a result of the significant increases in inter-
ventions and authorizations of the use of force. 38 The diminish-
revolution. The Council passed several resolutions pertaining to Korea, which
would have been vetoed by the Soviets if they had not boycotted. See id.
36 See U.N. Doc. 881, 111/3/46, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 502, 503-04 (1945); see also
Ev~A LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 50-51 (1982); RuTH B. RUSSELL
& JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 443-44,
46-54 (1958).
37 See DocuMENTs ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 415. The question of equitable
representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council was in-
cluded in the agenda of the General Assembly in 1979 at the request of Algeria,
Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhuta, Guyana, India, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri
Lanka. See U.N. Doc. A/34/246. This request noted that the membership of the
United Nations had increased from 113 at the time of enlargement of the Council
in 1963 to 152 in 1979, while the membership of the Council remained at 15. It
was not until thirteen years later, in December 1992, that the Assembly adopted a
resolution regarding this subject. See U.N. Doc. A/50/47, at 2. This resolution pro-
posed by thirty-six developing States and one Eastern European State was passed.
In this resolution the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to invite
Members States to submit written comments on a possible review of the Security
Council's Membership. At the time of this resolution, the U.N. membership had
increased to 179. See id. In July 1993, the Secretary General submitted a report
containing States' comments regarding reform. See U.N. Doc. A/48/264, Add. 1,
Add. 2, Add. 2/ Corr. 1 & Add. 3-10.
38 Authorizations of force were used in several countries during the 1990's.
See, e.g., SC Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRESJ678
(1990) (in relation to Kuwait); SC Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992) (in relation to Somalia); SC Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc, S/RES/816 (1993) (in relation to the protection of
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/5
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ing of political divisions within the Security Council and
increased Security Council activism once again raised great
concerns about the possible abuse of power.39 Many U.N. Mem-
ber States began to worry that future interventions would affect
their own countries. Member States also became increasingly
worried about the declining ability of non-members to influence
the Security Council.
B. Main Problems Causing the Need to Reform
1. Domination by the Security Council Over the United
Nations
Contrary to the principles of equality and representation,
the Security Council and its Permanent Members dominate the
U.N., rather than act on its behalf. This domination is a prod-
uct of the Security Council's exclusive powers, the self-interest
of Council Members and the absence of "Check and Balances" to
limit the Security Council's power.
a. Security Council's Exclusive Power
Preliminarily, the Charter provides that if the Security
Council is exercising any of its powers, the General Assembly
shall not make any recommendations with regard to the matter
"unless the Security Council so requests."40 Therefore, if the
Security Council wants to take over an issue, all substantive
powers are taken from the Assembly. The Security Council has
Bosnian airspace); SC Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/836 (1993) (in relation to the protection of Bosnian safe areas); SC Res. 929,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994) (in relation to
Rwanda); and SC Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
940 (1994) (in relation to Haiti); SC Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992) (in relation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Ser-
bia and Montenegro)); SC Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/748 (1992) (in relation to Libya); SC Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3138th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992) (in relation to Liberia).
39 See Lev Voronkov, International Peace and Security: New Challenges to the
U.N. 1-18, in TiE UNITED NATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE WORLD OR-
GANIZATION AT FIFTY (Dimitris Bourantonis & Jarod Weiner, eds. 1995) (discussing
the post-Cold War United Nations); see generally Sean D. Murphy, The Security
Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L . 201 (1994); see generally Cameron R. Hurne, The United
Nations, Iran And Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed (1994) (discussing Security
Council's treatment of Iran and Iraq since 1945).
40 U.N. CHARTER art. 12.
20001
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exclusive power to decide the dispute; and the General Assem-
bly cannot interfere with this decision. 41 A de facto amendment
was made to the Charter permitting the General Assembly to
make recommendations even where the Security Council seized
the problem, but these recommendations are in no way binding
on the Security Council.
b. Self-Interest of Council Members
In some parts of the world, especially in Africa, the Council was
seen as a disinterested and immovable body that was only roused
to action when conflicts around the world became so brutal and
bloody that they could not escape the attention of the selective
world media.42
Security Council Members normally act, or fail to act, only
in accordance with their own self-interest. The Security Coun-
cil may act, therefore, to the detriment of what may be more
beneficial to the international community as a whole. The au-
thorization of the use of force, which is normally made at the
request of a particular member, frequently reflects an individ-
ual member's own agenda. For example, the United States
pushed for a resolution in Haiti mainly because of the large
number of Haitians fleeing to its borders seeking asylum, not
because there was a threat to international peace or security.
Further, it is probably no coincidence that an unparalleled
number of discussions within the Security Council on one single
country, Rwanda, occurred at a time when Rwanda was a mem-
ber of the Security Council, between 1994 and 1995. It adopted
more than thirty resolutions and presidential statements con-
cerning Rwanda during this time. 43 In December 1994,
Rwanda actually presided over the Security Council. This poses
the question of what would have been the Security Council's ac-
tions had Rwanda not been a member at that time. France was
also accused of acting in its self-interest regarding Rwanda.
France gave arms to one side of the conflict throughout the mas-
41 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 7.
42 Assembly Adopts Text on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Takes Up Security Coun-
cil Reform U.N. Doc. GA/9688 (1999) (Statement by Representative of South
Africa).
43 See A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of the United Nations Security Council in
African Peace Management: Some Proposals, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 537 (1996).
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sacres, and it voted on the Security Council in a manner consis-
tent with its support of one faction.44
The Security Council Members also continually try to fulfill
their own agendas by influencing the decisions of other Security
Council Members' decisions with political or economic pres-
sure.45 For example, the self-interest of the United States was
suspicious to many during the Gulf War.46 Shortly after a vote
concerning Iraq, reportedly in retaliation for its negative vote,
the United States cut economic aid to Yemen. 47
The problem of self-interest is also evident when Perma-
nent Members are not willing to abstain from voting when they
44 See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Secur-
ity Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 562 (1993) (citing Erskine Childers, Gulf Crisis
Lessons for the U.N., in 23 BULL, PEACE PROPOSALS 129, 133 (1992)).
45 The Security Council has been described as "at best a police force of the
West and at worst an uncontrolled arm of the American government." DocuMENTS
ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 419-31 (Helen Leigh Phippard, Remaking the Secur-
ity Council: The Options).
46 Various reports have recounted that the U.S made several promises of re-
wards or threats of punishment outside the Council meetings to influence the pass-
ing of the resolution to use force against Iraq. See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy
of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 562-3
(1993) (citing Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf
Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 A.J.I.L. 516, 523-25 (1991) (Professor
Weston discusses the promise of financial help to Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia
and Zaire; agreement with the Soviet Union "to help keep Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania out of the November 1990 Paris summit conference"; and an agreement
to end trade sanction against China and to support World Bank loans to China));
"The real problem was that leadership turned into headship, where decisions for
the group are arrived at unilaterally by a leader whose overwhelming power en-
sures that subordinates will have few other options than to comply." Id. at 563
(citing Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgot & Kim R. Nossal, Bound to Follow?
Leadership and Fellowship in the Gulf Conflict, 106 POL. Sci. Q. 391, 407 (1991);
"[Tihe process by which Security Council Resolution 678 was won, while perhaps
legally correct stricto sensu, confirms how complete the power of the United States
over the U.N. policing mechanism had become in the absence of Cold War opposi-
tion." Id.
47 See Quigley, supra note 23, at 273 (citing Judith Miller, Kuwaiti Envoy
Says Baker Vowed 'No Concessions' to Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at A22)
(Kuwaiti ambassador to U.S. quoted as saying that Secretary Baker told him U.S.
would cut aid to Yemen because of its vote); see also Rick Atkinson & Barton Gell-
man, Iraq Trying to Shelter Jets in Iran: U.S. Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1991, at
Al. (State Department informed Congress it would cut aid to Yemen from a
planned $22 million to under $3 million. State Department did not deny a pub-
lished report which stated that after the vote on the Iraq resolution, a U.S. diplo-
mat told Yemen Ambassador Al-Ashtal, "that will be the most expensive vote you
will have cast.").
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are parties to a dispute. While the U.N. Charter states that, "a
party to a dispute shall abstain from voting" in decisions under
Chapter VI, 48 mandatory abstention does not apply to a "situa-
tion which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute," rather than an actual dispute.49 Because "dispute"
was never defined during the San Francisco conference, Secur-
ity Council Members have argued that the event was a "situa-
tion" and not a "dispute"; or if a dispute did exist, that the
member was not a party to it.50 When this issue was brought
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it concluded that
abstention from voting requires "the prior determination by the
Security Council that a dispute exists and that certain members
of the Security Council are involved as parties to such a dis-
pute."51 By exercising its veto power, a Permanent Member ex-
ercises control over the determination of whether it is or is not
involved in the dispute. The obvious result is that if a Perma-
nent Member wants to veto a Security Council action, it will
deem itself not to be party to a "dispute."
c. Lack of "Checks and Balances"
Finally, because its decisions are not revisable by any other
organ of the U.N., the Security Council can be said to dominate
the entire U.N. 52 The ICJ can issue advisory opinions, and the
General Assembly can render simultaneous opinions, but these
opinions are neither binding nor retroactive. The only "check"
on the Security Council's power may occur when it asks for
sanctions or troops, and no States respond. This check is highly
insufficient because the Security Council Members, in particu-
lar the Permanent Members, have sufficient military power to
48 U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
49 Frederic L. Kirgis, The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 511 (1995).
50 See id. at 506, 511. (citing YEHUDA Z. BLUM, ERODING THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER 196-98 (1993)).
51 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. REP. 16, 23 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
52 See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL: TESTING THE LEGALITY OF ITS ACTS 35 (1994); see also Jose E. Alvarez,
Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996) (discussing the issue of
whether the International Court of Justice should judicially review Security Coun-
cil decisions).
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implement a plan. Greater checks are necessary to prevent in-
fringements on state sovereignty and to balance the power of
the Security Council.
2. Veto Power
The most criticized aspect of the Security Council is the
Permanent Members' veto power.5 3 The actual use of the veto,
however, has declined since the end of the Cold War. The veto
was used 194 times between 1946 and 1990, but it was only
used nine times in the past decade.54 Russia has used its veto
power 120 times, but only twice in the past decade. 55 The
United States has vetoed seventy-two proposals over the
years.56 Britain has used its veto power thirty-two times,
France eighteen times, and China only five times.5 7 Despite the
decline, most Member States continue to oppose the veto
power. 58
53 The initial proposal for the veto arose at the request of the Soviet Union.
Stalin pushed to have it included in the Charter because he thought the other
Security Council Members would continuously out-vote his country's initiatives.
See VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 9, at 224. The United States demanded the veto
power arguing that the Senate would not otherwise consent to U.N. membership.
See id. A large number of Member States that participated in the San Francisco
Conference were against the inclusion of the veto power, but the Five Powers were
in unison on their determination to have this right. BAILEY, supra note 11, at 139.
They assured other States that they would not abuse their veto power, but this
proved otherwise. See id. Similar to other aspects, when it was clear that without
the veto the United Nations would not exist, the other Member States halted their
efforts to exclude it. See id. at 227. At its first and third sessions, the General
Assembly adopted resolutions pleading for the Permanent Members to restrain the
use of the veto. In the first two decades of the Security Council, the Soviet Union
cast 103 out of 110 vetoes issued. In the following two decades, the United States
used its veto power more than other Permanent Members. See also Study on the
Legal Basis of the veto: letter dated 11 August 1997 from the Under-Secretary-Gen-
eral for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services Addressed to the Vice-
Chairman of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/AC/247/1998/CRP.1 (1998), revised
by U.N. Doc. A/52/47/ANNEX12 (1999).
54 BAILEY, supra note 11, at 231-38.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See General Assembly Continues Debate on Security Council Reform With
Focus on Changing Veto, U.N. Doc. GA19692 (1999). The representative of Slo-
vakia stated that the veto was:
originally designed to foster unity and promote the search for understand-
ing among the great Powers, turned out to be a tool, often misused, either
in ideological battles among bitter rivals during the cold war or for narrow
15
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Essentially, if any Permanent Member vetoes a proposal,
the Security Council is completely frozen. 59 Further, the Five
Powers can free themselves from the governance of the Security
Council, the General Assembly and the United Nations as a
whole by merely vetoing any proposal made against their inter-
ests. As stated above, if the Security Council is considering a
problem, aside from issuing non-binding resolutions, the Gen-
eral Assembly may not interfere. Thus, if the General Assem-
bly attempts to address a problem caused by a Permanent
Member, the Permanent Member simply has to put the problem
on the Security Council's agenda, and the General Assembly is
no longer permitted to take further firm action. Permanent
Members can also shield allied Member States by using this
same technique.
Although much attention is given to the veto, the problem
of the reverse veto may prove to be more detrimental. The re-
verse veto does not block Security Council action, but rather
blocks the termination or altering of a resolution that has al-
ready been passed.6 0 This has more relevance today consider-
ing the relative increase in the Security Council's activities in
the past decade. For example, after days of bombarding Iraq,
several countries sought to establish peace initiatives and bring
an end to the attack. Both the United States and the United
Kingdom, however, argued that they were authorized to con-
tinue using force until a further resolution passed and ended
political interests. Even now, it could paralyze the Council, rendering it
unable to take effective action on behalf of Member States.
Id.
Some arguments have been made in favor of retaining the veto, See id; see, e.g.,
DOCUMENTS ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 423-24 (discussing that the loss of the
veto would result in influential U.N. Members disinterest in the organization and
that the veto allows control over the number of operations the United Nations en-
gages.); see also VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 9, at 225-27 (1987) (proponents believe
that the existence of the United Nations depends on the veto).
59 Although the General Assembly can surpass a "frozen" Security Council, it
rarely does. See infra at Section IV.B (discussing the Uniting for Peace
Resolution).
60 See Caron, supra note 44, at 577. The problem of the reverse veto resulted
from the silence in the Charter regarding termination or alterations of previous
actions.
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their authority. Furthermore, each stated they would veto any
such provision. 61
3. Non-Participation of U.N. Members in Security Council
Decisions
Three provisions in the U.N. Charter and the provisions in
the Security Council's own Provisional Rules of Procedure pro-
vide for participation by the U.N. Members in the Security
Council's decision-making process when they are affected or
when they have an interest in the Security Council's actions.
Article 31 provides: "Any member of the United Nations which
is not a member of the Security Council may participate, with-
out vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the
Security Council whenever the latter considers that the inter-
ests of that Member are specially affected."62 Article 32 pro-
vides that any Member State or non-U.N. Member State that is
a party to the dispute "shall be invited to participate, without
vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute."63 Article 50 pro-
vides that those third party States affected by Security Council
actions shall have the right to consult the Security Council. 64
The Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure also
contain similar provisions giving Member States the right to be
heard. Rule 37 provides:
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the
Security Council may be invited, as a result of a decision of the
Security Council, to participate without vote, in the discussion of
any question brought before the Security Council when the Secur-
61 See Paul Lewis, U.S. and Britain Assert U.N. Power: They Say They Can
Continue Sanctions and the War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at A4.
62 See U.N. CHARTER art. 31.
63 See id. at art. 32. Article 32 provides in full: "Any Member of the United
Nations which is not a member of the Security Council and any state which is not a
Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by
the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion
relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it
deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United
Nations." Id.
64 See id. at art. 50. Article 50 provides: "If preventive or enforcement mea-
sures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state,
whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with
special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall
have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those
problems." Id.
2000]
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ity Council considers that the interests of that Member are spe-
cially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention
of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35(1) of the
Charter.65
The inherent problem with both Article 31 of the Charter and
the Security Council's Provisional Rule 37 is that the discretion
to allow participation by a Member State lies in the hands of the
Security Council itself. Both Article 32 and Article 50, however,
seem to create the right of participation when a Member State's
interests are affected.
Contrary to these mandates, decisions are frequently made
without any input from the countries involved.66 Resolutions
are often taken without involving non-Security Council Mem-
bers and without hearing outside points of view.67 Such resolu-
tions include decisions affecting only the domestic affairs of a
country. Even when the Security Council hears an argument by
a Member State, it typically will have no bearing or impact on
the resolution under discussion "which will have been prepared,
every 'i' dotted and every 't' crossed, during previous informal
consultations."6
4. Lack of Transparency of Security Council Meetings
Directly linked to the problem of non-participation of U.N.
Member States in Security Council decisions is the absence of
transparency in the Security Council's meetings. The Council's
Provisional Rules provide, "unless it decides otherwise, the Se-
curity Council shall meet in public."69 Apparently, the Security
65 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.S/96/Rev.7
(1996), Rule 37 [hereinafter Rules of Procedure]. See also Rule 38 which provides:
Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preced-
ing rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the
discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft reso-
lutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only
at the request of a representative on the Security Council.
Id. at Rule 38.
66 See Anthony Aust, The Procedure and Practice of the Security Council To-
day, in PEACE KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL 366 (Rene-Jean Dupuy, ed. 1993).
67 See id.
68 The case for a new interpretation of Article 31 of the Charter of the United
Nations: working paper by the Czech Republic, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1996/CRP. 13,
revised by U.N. Doc. A/52/47 (1998).
69 Rules of Procedure, supra note 65, at Rule 48.
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Council has chosen "otherwise" in the majority of its decision-
making proceedings.
In the early years, most of the Security Council's meetings
were held in public, and verbatim records were maintained, in-
cluding records on procedural debates and votes. 70 Today the
records are scant and offer little indication of the proceedings
actually held before a resolution is adopted.7 1 Private informal
consultations are now the norm.72 In fact, nearly all the Secur-
ity Council's work occurs in informal consultations from which
Member States are excluded and which only Security Council
Members or the Secretariat may attend.7 3 It is usually agreed
in these consultations that no debate will take place in the offi-
cial meeting and that no non-Security Council Members will
speak.74 In other words, the official public meetings of the Se-
curity Council have generally become "very much a prear-
ranged, set-piece affair." 75 Closed consultations are also held by
sub-groups of the Security Council, such as the five Permanent
Members alone.7 6
The following description provides additional details on the
Security Council proceedings in informal consultations:
Probably in order to avoid the recurrence of the difficult public
meetings punctuated by procedural disputes which had marked
the cold war era, special attention has for several years been
70 See Aust, supra note 66, at 366.
71 See id.
72 See id. Aust noted the curious fact that a special room was constructed in
the 1979s in the vicinity of the actual Security Council Chamber, which is a minia-
ture of the actual chamber and was designed specifically for the informal consulta-
tions. See id. Previously, the informal meetings took place in the President's
office, making them informal but also physically uncomfortable. In 1975, the con-
struction of a separate room was authorized and completed in 1978. Curiously,
from 1977 to 1978, the number of informal meetings increased three-fold and the
time of the meetings quadrupled. See id.; see also Lois Feuerle, Informal Consulta-
tions: A Mechanism in Security Council Decision-Making, 18 N.Y.U. J. of INT'L L. &
POL. 267 (1985).
73 See Aust, supra note 65, at 237. Concerning both the situations which
arose in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Libya, the Council met almost entirely in private
sessions. See Frederic L. Kirgis, The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 506, 519 (1995). Also, the Council passed the resolution involving Somalia
without any public debate. See Ruth Gordan, United Nations Intervention in Inter-
nal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MicH. J. INfL L. 519, 554 (1994).
74 See Aust, supra note 66, at 367.
75 Id.
76 See Kirgis, supra note 49, at 519 (1995).
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given to delivering only a finished product at official meetings of
the Council. In other words, it is still customary nowadays to
wait until all the differences of opinion within the Council have
been settled, and a text has been negotiated down to the last
comma, before holding an official meeting. The script for such a
meeting has always been worked out beforehand in its tiniest de-
tails so as to leave no room for surprises. The consequence of this
is, inevitably, the declaratory, rigid style of such meetings, at
which delegations not members of the Council may be heard read-
ing out their prepared statements before a decision is taken, with
members presenting before and after the vote explanations which,
of course, do not take into account the arguments put forth during
the debate leading up to the vote. 7
7
C. Obstacles to Reforming the Council
While the above section provides an overview for a multi-
tude of problems existing in the Security Council as well as a
demonstration of the need to reform the Security Council, sev-
eral obstacles continue to block Security Council reform. These
obstacles include procedures to amend the Charter, a majority
vote requirement to pass reform measures, and general finan-
cial and political realities.
1. Procedures to Amend the Charter
Although the drafters of the Charter foresaw that amend-
ments would most likely be necessary in the future and, there-
fore, included amendment procedures, the actual ability to
amend the Charter depends on the Permanent Members of the
Security Council. 78 The Charter can only be amended by a two-
thirds vote of the General Assembly in addition to ratification
by two-thirds of the Security Council (including the Permanent
77 Letter dated November, 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A149/667-S/
1994/1279, at 12 (1994).
78 U.N. CHARTER arts. 108, 109. Article 108 provides:
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all members
of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-
thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the United Nations, including all permanent members of the
Council.
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Members). 79 Any restructuring through means of amending the
Charter, therefore, will ultimately depend on the Security
Council and the Permanent Members themselves.8 0
2. Financial and Political Realities
Simply stated, a few countries in the world have extreme
economic and political control over the majority of the smaller
nations. While most countries are in favor of reform, it will
most likely be an extremely long process, if it occurs at all. It is
possible reform measures will never be obtained since the
smaller nations will most likely submit to the pressures of the
larger powers in the world. Stronger Member States will con-
tinue to put political pressure on other Member States in an
attempt to halt reforms or to press only for the reforms that
they want. Member States may also boycott or withhold funds
from the United Nations if they do not agree with reform
measures.
Despite all of these obstacles, U.N. Member States are con-
tinuing to press for reform. It is certain that reforming the Se-
curity Council will remain a high priority on the United
Nation's agenda until a solution is found. With that in mind, it
is important to set forth those measures that are being
considered.
79 See id. See generally Carolyn L. Willson, Changing the Charter: The United
Nations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 115 (1996) (dis-
cussing amendment procedures of the U.N. Charter).
80 In 1998, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requiring a majority of
the General Assembly's affirmative votes to invoke any Security Council reform.
See Security Council: Increase in Membership, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/30 (1998). This
could prove to be a major impediment to reform measures if agreement cannot be
reached. The Resolution provides:
The General Assembly... mindful of Chapter XVIII of the Charter of the
United Nations and of the importance of reaching general agreement as
referred to in [a previous resolution], determines not to adopt any resolu-
tion or decision on the question of equitable representation on and in-
crease in the membership of the Security Council and related matters,
without the affirmative vote of at lease two thirds of the Members of the
General Assembly.
2000]
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IV. PROPOSALS PRESENTED TO REFORM THE
SECURITY COUNCIL
The proposals being discussed are remarkably similar to
those rejected over fifty years ago during the formation of the
Security Council.8 1 This reflects the continued disenchantment
with the Security Council and the desire to implement change.
This Section provides proposals from Member States, regional
groups, the U.N. Working Group, and the author's own propos-
als. These proposals attempt to increase equality and represen-
tation for all U.N. Member States.
Member States have individually made proposals; in addi-
tion, various States have joined regional groups to present their
ideas uniformly.8 2 These groups include the Non-Aligned Move-
ment ("NAM") and the Groups of African, Arab, Asian and
Latin States.8 3 Due to the overwhelming number of proposals
submitted by over 100 Member States either individually or col-
lectively, this Section only provides some examples and is,
therefore, not exhaustive of the topic.
The Working Group is also currently formulating propos-
als. The Working Group, formed in 1993,84 met for the first
time in January 199485 and had its mandate extended by the
General Assembly at its forty-eighth through fifty-second ses-
sions. Reports on its progress were submitted at each of these
sessions. The Working Group appears to be independent and
81 See THE ONCE AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL 1 (Bruce Russet, ed., St.
Martin's Press 1997).
82 See, e.g., Question of equitable Representation on and Increase in the Mem-
bership of the Security Council and Related Matters, U.N. GAOR, 491h Sess.,
Agenda Item 33, U.N. Doe. A149/965 (1995) (compendium of numerous State's pro-
posals) [hereinafter Question of Equitable Representation]; see also U.N. Doc. Al
AC. 247/5(a)-(l) (proposals submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belize,
Cuba, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Singapore and Turkey).
83 NAM has 113 members from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the
Caribbean. During the cold war, non - alignment was the answer of the develop-
ing world to the policies and rivalries promoted by the then existing superpowers.
See http://www.nonaligned.orglintro.html. The members of the NAM constitute
eighty percent of the U.N. membership. See General Assembly Continues Debate
on Security Council Reform With Focus on Changing Veto U.N. Doc. GA/9692, Per-
manent Membership (1999) [hereinafter Debate on Security Council Reform].
84 G.A. Res. 48/26, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/48/26 (1993), revised by U.N. Doc.
A/52/47/Annex I. (1999).
85 U.N. Doc. A/48/47 (1994) (Working Group's first report).
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has conducted bilateral consultations with over 165 countries.8 6
Its substantive meetings are open to all U.N. delegations to sub-
mit any oral or written proposals.8 7 The latest report of the
Working Group, released on August 5, 1999, failed to make any
firm recommendations.88 Its only so-called "recommendation"
reads as follows:
At its 53rd meeting, on 30 July 1999, the Open-ended Working
Group concluded its work for the current session of the General
Assembly and decided to recommend that consideration of this
item be continued at the fifty-fourth session of the Assembly,
building upon the work done during the previous sessions. To that
end, the Working Group recommends to the General Assembly"
that the Working Group should continue its work.8 9
In other words, the Working Group did not make any recom-
mendations. 90 In fact, after seven years the Working Group has
only made "general observations" that certain "elements [have]
emerged that may prove useful when the Working Group re-
sumes its work."91
The following are the five main areas of reform currently
being discussed regarding increased representation and equal-
ity of Member States in the Security Council: 1) adding addi-
tional Permanent Members; 2) increasing the overall Security
Council membership; 3) changing the veto power; 4) increasing
participation in the decision making process; and 5) increasing
transparency.
A. Additional Permanent Members
Adding Permanent Members has been proposed several
times since the Security Council's formation. Less than twenty
86 See http://www.undp.org/missions/italy/statemen/reform/130397.htm. See
also David Bills, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention:
The Ramifications of Reform on the United Nations' Security Council, 31 TEx. IN_'L
L. J. 107, 116-122 (1996) (over viewing some of the Working Group's practices).
87 See Question of Equitable Representation, supra note 82.
88 See Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on and Increase in the Mem-
bership of the Security Council and other Matters Related to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. A/53/47 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Working Group Report].
89 Id.
W The Working Group made the same "recommendation" in each of its previ-
ous reports. See U.N. Doc. A/52/47, U.N. Doc. A/51/47; U.N. Doc. A/50/47; U.N.
Doc. A/49/47; U.N. Doc. A/48/47.
91 1999 Working Group Report, supra note 88, at 5-6.
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years after its creation, and again in 1979 suggestions were
made to expand the Permanent Membership, but were never
implemented. 92 In 1991, the interest resurfaced again with the
fall of the Soviet Union and the hopes that its seat would be-
come vacant, but Russia eventually replaced the Soviet Union
in that position.
1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups
The majority of States presumably agree on the need to en-
large the Security Council's permanent membership. 93 Previ-
ously, the Five Powers strongly resisted any attempt to enlarge
this membership, but more recently they have supported the
idea.94 The most widely accepted proposal is to add Japan and/
or Germany, which are the second and third largest contribu-
tors to the U.N. regular budget.95 The other potential candi-
dates for permanent seats include Nigeria and Brazil. 96
A wide variety of other proposals have been made.97 These
include the following: 1) Tenured membership: members could
occupy seats for longer than two years; 2) Extended member-
ship: these seats would not be subject to the prohibition against
92 See DocuMENTs ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 425.
93 See, e.g., Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83.
94 See, e.g., General Assembly Continues Discussion of Security Council Re-
form, U.N. Doc. GA/9689 (1999) (in which the United Kingdom, China, and France
expressed such support) [hereinafter Discussions of Security Council Reform].
95 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 387. Japan's contributions to the regular
U.N. budget have exceeded the combined amount of four of the five Permanent
Members. See THE ONCE AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 81, at 118
(Ian Hurd, Security Council Reform: Informal Membership and Practice). The
United States is the largest contributor. See id. Japan wants the total member-
ship to increase to 24 including 5 new Permanent Members and 4 new non-perma-
nent members. See Assembly Adopts Text on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Takes Up
Security Council Reform, U.N. Doc. GA/9688 (1999) (Statement by the U.N. Repre-
sentative of Japan). See also generally Masayuki Tadokoro, A Japanese View on
Restructuring the Security Council, in THE ONCE AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL,
supra note 81, at 120-33.
96 See DocuMENTs ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 425.
97 See id. at 435-36. One author made a curious observation, as he pointed
out, at the time the five recognized nuclear-weapon states made up the entire per-
manent membership of the General Council. At the time of the U.N.'s formation,
only the United States had operational nuclear weapons, but throughout the years
all of the other Member States also acquired this capability. Thus, powerful states
have been equated with states with nuclear capabilities. India and Pakistan have
used this argument in attempting to gain permanent seats in the Council. See id.
at 419.
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re-election of consecutive two-year terms; 3) Two stage ap-
proach: enlarge the permanent seats by a certain amount at the
first stage and at the second stage the specific countries to re-
ceive the seats would be announced; 98 4) Redistribution of the
permanent seats: the two obvious choices are to replace France
and Great Britain which are no longer economic nor military
powers;99 5) Replacing seats: creating one single European
Union permanent seat to replace Great Britain and France. 10 0
Other Member States suggest adding permanent seats on the
basis of geographical representation. 10 1 The Group of Arab
States want a "full-fledged rotating permanent seat" which
would entail that one permanent seat would go to the Arab
States on a rotating basis amongst this region.' 0 2 The African
States want to be allocated no less than two permanent
seats. 0 3 The African States and Arab States also want new
Permanent Members to possess the same prerogatives and pow-
ers as the current members.'0 4 It is clear that most Member
States and regional groups favor expanding the permanent
membership. The uncertainty of exactly which or how many
States will be added remains to be the difficulty.
98 See, e.g., Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83 (in which the
Slovakia representative condemned such a two stage approach as "methodically
wrong").
99 See DocumENTs ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 426.
100 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 386 (citing Rapportuer Renzo Trivelli Report
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the role of the Union within the
U.N. and the problems of reforming the U.N. Parl. Doc. (A3-0331/93) (1993)) (pro-
posal by developing countries and the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Security of
the European Parliament). The two countries have consistently objected to any
proposals that would result in the loss of their seats. See id.
101 See DocuMENTs ON REFORM, supra note 5, at 425.
102 Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83.
103 See Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Or-
ganization of African Unity on the Procedures for Rotation of the Two Permanent
Seats Claimed by Africa, transmitted by Senegal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.16
and Corr. 1 (1999), revised by A/52/47 Annex XXIV.
104 See 1999 Working Group Report, supra note 88, Letter dated 29 July 1999
from the Permanent Representative of Algeria transmitting the African position
on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the
Security Council, pp. 54-55, entitled "Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the reform of the
United Nations Security Council," See also Letter dated 27 January 1998 from the
Permanent Representative of Bahrain in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of
Arab States for the month of January 1998 addressed to the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.2 (1998).
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2. Working Group's Proposals
The Working Group has failed to reach a decisive consen-
sus on the expansion of the permanent membership category of
the Security Council. While concluding that the majority of
Member States expressed a preference for an increase in per-
manent seats, the Working Group, rather than making any pro-
posals, has only thus far listed issues in its ongoing conference
room paper. Such issues include: "Can we agree whether it is
desirable to have an expansion that includes both additional
permanent and additional non-Permanent Members?; Can we
agree on how any additional permanent seats should be
allocated?"' 0 5
3. Author's Proposals
There are a few countries that appear to believe that the only
yardstick by which progress on this issue can be measured is the
achievement of their ambition to become a permanent member of
the Council. Their desire to seek a permanent status on the Se-
curity Council is not motivated by altruistic or noble sentiments.
It is an undisguised grab for power and privilege. 10 6
New permanent seats should not be granted to any individ-
ual U.N. Member State. In the new millennium, special privi-
leges should not be bestowed on some and denied to others. The
addition of any individual Member States as a Permanent
Member would only make the Security Council more unrepre-
sentative, unequal, and unresponsive to the concerns of the
other countries. The status of Permanent Members should
never have been created when the Security Council was formed,
and it is inconceivable at this point that the current Permanent
Members will ever relinquish their power. Although this au-
thor does not support the continued permanent membership of
the majority of its current State Members, at this stage, it
seems impossible to attempt to revoke any Permanent Mem-
ber's status.
Besides the countries fighting for a permanent seat, it is
unclear why numerous other Member States also accept the
105 1999 Working Group Report, supra note 88, at 20-21.
106 Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83. (Statement of represen-
tative Pakistan).
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idea of additional individual States' seats. Permanent Member
status was strongly opposed at the San Francisco Conference.
It was not seriously challenged, however, because it became
clear that the Five Powers would reject the Charter completely
unless this status was conferred upon them. 0 7 No doubt exists
today, however, that if the Charter were drafted de novo, the
same Permanent Members would not be chosen.
If new Permanent Members are chosen from a particular
country, the same issues will arise in the future as to whether
these countries deserve permanent status. For example, when
the United Nations was formed, both Germany and Japan were
prohibited from joining and were officially deemed to be "enemy
states" in the original Charter.108 Now, they are the prime can-
didates to receive permanent seats. Future historical and polit-
ical trends are uncertain. It does not seem prudent to designate
permanent seats when it is uncertain whether these countries
will later deserve to remain in such a position. This problem
would only be exacerbated if the potential new members were
given the right to veto.
While many countries support Japan and Germany becom-
ing Permanent Members, this proposal should be rejected. If
Germany were selected this would lead to three seats being
maintained by Western European countries. If Japan were cho-
sen this would cause more domination by the industrialized na-
tions. France, Great Britain, and the United States want Japan
to become a permanent member because they all have strong
political ties with Japan, and Japan would most likely vote sim-
ilarly to them. This is not a solution to provide more equality
and representation.
107 See Kirgis, supra note 49, at 507; see also VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 9, at
54-55. The predecessor to the U.N.'s Security Council had similar problems. Orig-
inally, the Council of the League was to consist of representatives from the United
States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan as Permanent Members and six
members selected by the General Assembly. The American seat was never occu-
pied. Germany later also received a permanent member seat. Yet, many other
member states sought permanent membership including Brazil, Spain and Poland.
Brazil withdrew from the League after the General Assembly refused to amend the
Covenant to accommodate more Permanent Members (to appease the smaller na-
tions, the non-membership was expanded to nine seats). See id.
108 Germany, Italy, and, Japan were all later admitted into the U.N. in 1973,
1955 and 1956, respectively.
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As already suggested by some regional groups, the ideal ap-
proach is to create permanent seats based on regional represen-
tation. It is the small and medium sized countries that
constitute the overwhelming majority of the United Nations,
and it is they who must be given greater representation in the
decision-making process of the Security Council. These groups
have already been self-proclaimed as the following: African
Group, Arab Group, Asian Group and Latin Group. Each of
these groups should be afforded one permanent seat. The rep-
resentative from each group should be selected by an agreement
of each region itself and not by the General Assembly. This will
provide more equitable representation and equality of U.N.
Member States.
B. Increasing Overall Security Council Membership
The second most debated reform measure involves increas-
ing the overall membership of the Security Council. This has
also been a recurrent theme throughout the years. In 1963,
forty-four African and Asian States argued that since the U.N.
membership had increased to 112 members from the original
fifty-one, the membership of the Security Council should also be
increased.' 0 9 Despite initial opposition, an amendment to en-
large the Security Council was ratified in 1965, increasing the
number of non-Permanent Members from six to ten. 110
Subsequent to this amendment, several other proposals for
expansion were advanced. In 1979, a proposal was made to in-
crease the number of non-Permanent Members to fourteen."'
In 1980, a group of African, Asian and Latin States proposed
the addition of six non-Permanent Members with a majority of
fourteen members required to pass a resolution. 1 2 In 1981, the
Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on
the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization submitted a
report recommending an increase in the membership of the Se-
curity Council "taking into account the principle of equitable ge-
109 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 152.
110 See EvERYoNE's UNITED NATIONS, 16 (U.N. Publications 10th ed. 1986).
111 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 382.
112 See id.
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ographical distribution."113 All of these proposals were opposed
by the Permanent Members and were never implemented. 114
1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups
Currently, most Member States agree that the Security
Council should be expanded, but there is widespread disagree-
ment on how many additional members should be added. Inde-
cisiveness about the exact number is demonstrated in a paper
submitted by Colombia on behalf of numerous other delega-
tions. It states, "[T]he Security Council should be expanded to:
a) No more than 20 to 21 members; b) 24 members; c) 23 to 25
members; d) Not less than 26 members; e) Any other option."115
Permanent Members such as the United Kingdom, China,
and France now accept the general idea of enlarging the Secur-
ity Council as long as it does not hinder its efficiency. 1 6 France
has stated that it agrees with the need to expand the non-Per-
manent Members to between twenty-one and twenty-five
seats. 117 The United States supports expansion but has stated
that expansion beyond twenty-one Members will be chal-
lenged."l 8 Russia agrees that the increase should not exceed
113 McWHINNEY, supra note 9, at 136 (citing U.N. GAOR, special comm., 36'
Sess., Supp. No. 33, U.N. Doc. A/36/33, (1981)).
114 With the 1981 proposal, they argued that the Security Council was "very
carefully balanced and, in its present form, correctly reflected the international
balance of power." Id. This argument is no longer valid.
115 Conference room paper on the expansion of the Security Council and deci-
sion-making in the Security Council, including the veto, submitted by Colombia on
behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy,
Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, the Republic of Korea, San Marino, Singapore, Spain,
and Turkey. Relationship between the Security Council and other Principal organs
of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. AIAC.247/1999/CRP.4 (1999), revised by A/53/47/
Annex V (1999).
116 See Discussion of Security Council Reform, supra note 94.
117 See id.
118 See Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83. The United States
stated that it agrees with expansion but:
the working group must balance the legitimate desire for greater repre-
sentation with the equally compelling need to preserve the Council's abil-
ity to react decisively against fast-breaking challenges to international
peace and security. We will oppose any expansion that threaten the abil-
ity of the Council to carry out its responsibilities under the Charter ...
The gravity of those responsibilities is too great to risk compromising the
Council's ability to meet them.
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twenty or twenty-one and has stated that going beyond these
numbers would affect the efficiency of the Security Council. 119
NAM and all of the regional groups have produced their
own solutions. NAM supports the increase in membership by
no less than eleven new members "based on the principles of
equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of
States."120 The Asian Group has argued that it deserves special
consideration in the composition of an expanded Security Coun-
cil due to its vast geographical coverage and population.' 2 ' The
African Group wants the "composition of the Security Council
[to] be democratized to reflect the increase in the number of
Member States of the United Nations" and to consist of twenty-
six States, allocating five non-permanent seats to African coun-
tries "for the benefit of developing countries, and African coun-
tries in particular." 22 The Arab Group supports expansion to
at least twenty-six Members to ensure the Security Council is
"democratized to reflect the increase in the number of States
members of the United Nations" 23
2. Working Group's Proposals
The Working Group has only made "general observations"
regarding expanding the Security Council and has reported
that "the number of members of an enlarged Security Council
should be from 20 to 26 as a minimum ... and [tihe scope and
modalities of the periodic review of an enlarged Security Coun-
119 See id.
120 Letter dated 10 July 1998 transmitted by Egypt in its capacity as coordina-
tor of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, U.N. Doc. AJAC.247/1998/CRP.21
(1998).
121 See Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83
122 U.N. Doc. A/53/47, Annex XIII, Letter dated 29 July 1999 from the Perma-
nent Representative of Algeria transmitting the African position on the question of
equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Coun-
cil, pp. 54-55, entitled "Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the Organization of African Unity on the reform of the United Na-
tions Security Council."
123 Letter dated 27 January 1998 from the Permanent Representative of
Bahrain in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States for the month of
January 1998 addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.247/1998/CRP.2 (1998); Letter dated 27 January 1998 from the Permanent Rep-
resentative of Bahrain in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States for
the month of January 1998 addressed to the President of the General Assembly,
revised by U.N. Doc. A/52/47 (1998).
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cil should be further considered."1 24 Beyond this "general ob-
servation" and concluding that the majority of Member States
support an increase in non-permanent seats, the Working
Group once again has only thus far listed issues.125
3. Author's Proposal
The U.N. Member States are, numerically speaking,
grossly under-represented in the Security Council. A more eq-
uitable representation in the Security Council may be obtained
by increasing the number of its Members, taking into account
the substantial increase in the membership of the United Na-
tions, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes
in international relations. This will not only enhance the credi-
bility of the Security Council and reflect the universal character
of the world body, but would modify existing imbalances in the
composition of the Security Council.
Apparently, the only obstacle to expanding the Security
Council membership is an agreement upon a number. An
agreement must take into consideration adequate representa-
tion of the Member States and continued effectiveness to act.
The Security Council must be sufficiently large to represent the
Member States, while remaining small enough to operate with
"prompt and effective action" in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security on behalf of the entire U.N.
membership. 26
Similar to the amendment in 1963 to increase membership,
the General Assembly should pass an amendment to increase
the entire Security Council membership to twenty-five seats.
Encompassing the proposal stated above, which would add four
new permanent seats on a regional basis to the African, Arab,
Asian and Latin Groups, this amendment would increase the
overall membership by only ten members. The result would be
124 1999 Working Group Report, supra note 88, at 5-6.
125 Id. at 20- 21. These issues include:
Can we agree that every endeavor should be made to explore the possibil-
ity of Security Council enlargement?; Can we agree whether it is desirable
to have an expansion of additional non-Permanent Members?; Can we
agree on what should be the lower/upper numerical limits of expansion,
depending on whether expansion will take place in one or two categories?
Id.
126 U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
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the continued representation as Permanent Members by China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States;
new representation by the regional African, Arab, Asian, and
Latin Groups; and the remainder of sixteen seats to be divided
on the grounds of equitable representation of the different re-
gions of the world.
This proposal will obviously be challenged by the United
States and Russia and possibly the United Kingdom. France,
however, has stated that it will support an increase of ten mem-
bers, and China which is normally the silent, passive perma-
nent member will also most likely support this increase.
Similar to the situation leading up to the previous amendment
on expansion, the U.N. Member States will have to continually
pressure the opposing Member States and the Permanent Mem-
bers into an agreement. Eventually the opposition will proba-
bly be subordinated to the majority of Member States' demands.
Changing the time period during which a non-permanent
member serves on the Security Council can also provide greater
equitable representation of the entire U.N. membership. In-
stead of serving two-year terms, each non-permanent member
should serve a one-year term.
C. Veto Proposals
Proposals regarding the veto can be grouped into three cat-
egories: modify the current veto power; narrow the veto to cer-
tain categories; or completely abolish the veto. The problem of
reforming the veto is intertwined with the issue of increasing
the permanent membership of the Security Council. Thus, re-
forming the veto involves two considerations: the veto power of
the existing Permanent Members and the veto power of possible
future Permanent Members.
1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups
While most U.N. Member States agree that the veto power
must be reformed in some manner, Permanent Members such
as the United States and the Russian Federation adamantly ob-
ject to any reform of the veto.127 Russia's representative re-
jected the claim that the veto almost led to a paralysis of the
127 See Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83.
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Security Council and stated that the veto is an indispensable
tool.128 The United Kingdom claimed that the voting rights of
the existing Permanent Members are fundamental to both the
authority of the Security Council and its ability to function ef-
fectively, and it would firmly oppose any restrictions on these
rights. 129 The other Permanent Members have made similar
statements and arguments.
Several groups and States have made proposals and state-
ments contrary to the Permanent Members' opinions. 130 NAM
has suggested a two-step restriction process: at present, the use
of the veto would be restricted to Chapter VII issues, and, even-
tually, the veto would be completely abolished. 13' The African
Group also wants the exercise of the right of veto to be progres-
sively curtailed until complete abrogation. 32 This Group has
also stated that if the veto is not eliminated, then additional
Permanent Members should be granted the same privilege. 133
Other proposals submitted on behalf of various countries in-
clude limiting the veto power by prohibiting its use in the fol-
lowing instances: gathering information and ascertaining facts;
calling on parties to settle disputes by peaceful means; calling
128 See id.
129 See Discussions of Security Council Reform, supra note 94. The United
Kingdom also stated that it would exercise its voting rights with restraint and in a
manner consistent with Charter obligations. See id.
130 See, e.g., Proposal on the issue of the veto, submitted by Chile, dated 26 June
1998, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1998/CRP.19 (1998), revised by U.N. Doc. A/52/47/Annex
XVII (1998). "The Permanent Members of the Security Council should recognize
the concept that their right to veto cannot be eternal and should commit them-
selves to discussing its abolition.. ."; Proposals on decision-making in the Security
Council and the veto right, submitted by Germany, dated 21 April 1998: voting
rights of the existing Permanent Members, U.N. Doc. A/AC/247/1998/CRP.8, revised
by U.N. Doc. A/52/47Annex XIV (1998); Proposals on decision-making in the Secur-
ity Council and the veto right, submitted by Germany, dated 22 April 1998: voting
rights of the existing Permanent Members A/AC.247/1998/CRP.9 (1998) revised by
U.N. Doc. A/52/47/Annex XXII (1998).
131 See Questions of the Veto: Working paper by Egypt on behalf of the Move-
ment of Non-Aligned Countries, 20 May 1996 (1996) U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1996/
CRP.9 (1996), revised by U.N. GAOR, 50' Sess., supp. 47, U.N. Doc. A/50/47/Add.1/
Annex VII (1996). For the past twenty years, NAM has called for review of the
veto power and addressed this issue at the numerous of its Summits. See id.
132 United Nations reforms African Common Position, 25 April 1996, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.247/1996/CRP.6 (1996), revised by U.N. GAOR, 5 0' Sess., Supp. 47, U.N.
Doc. A/50/47/Add.l/Annex IV (1996) (extract from Organization of African Unity
document NY/OAU/POL/84/94/Rev. 2 (1994)).
133 See id.
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on the parties to a conflict to respect human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law; mediating and preventing conflicts;
and dispatching U.N. observers. 3 4
2. Working Group's Proposals
The Working Group not only failed to make any recommen-
dations concerning the veto, but it also omitted any discussion
on the veto in its last report. It merely stated that the question
of the veto had to be considered, and proposed the issue, "Can
we agree to what extent, if any, the veto should be extended to
any additional Permanent Members?" 135
It is curious to note, however, that the report of 1998 does
include the following "suggested improvements":
... the Charter should be amended to restrict vetoes to only Chap-
ter VII issues; a single veto should be insufficient to nullify a pro-
posal if the required majority had voted affirmatively; the right of
the veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions as
defined by a qualified majority of the General Assembly; and the
list of decisions deemed procedural should be updated. 136
All of these "suggested improvements" were deleted from the
subsequent, current report of the Working Group.
3. Author's Proposals
Ideally, the veto power should be completely abolished.
Empowering only five U.N. Member States with the right to
veto contradicts the fundamental principles of equality and rep-
resentation provided in the Charter and is contrary to the
United Nation's ideals. Further, the Permanent Members
should no longer be free from the governance of the United Na-
tions. While in recent years the Permanent Members have
shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto,
there are no guarantees that this tendency will continue to the
point of being irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat of using
134 See Proposals on decision-making in the Security Council, including the
veto, submitted by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, dated 25 June 1999,U.N. Doc. AIAC/
247/1998/CRP.17 (1998), revised by U.N. Doc. A/52/47/Annex XVI (1998).
135 1999 Working Group Report, supra note 88, at 20.
136 Id. at 15.
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the veto can have a strong impact on the Security Council's pro-
ceedings and on the final outcome of its debates.
The obvious "Catch-22" is that the Permanent Members
can, and most likely will, veto any proposal to abolish their veto
power. A roundabout approach of first attempting to modify or
limit the veto power should therefore be taken. This would al-
low the Permanent Members to take "baby steps" towards fi-
nally accepting and deferring to the request of almost all U.N.
Member States that the veto be reformed. Initial limitations
could include requiring two votes by the Permanent Members to
constitute a veto, or limiting use of the veto to Chapter VII is-
sues only.
At a minimum, the General Assembly should adopt a decla-
ration or resolution expressing its attitude towards the veto as a
voting instrument in the Security Council, encouraging the cur-
tailment of the veto and requesting, in the event of any veto of a
draft resolution that the Permanent Member provide an expla-
nation of its actions. The General Assembly should also suggest
that the Permanent Members be allowed to declare that they
are casting a negative vote, without having such vote constitute
a veto. Finally, the problem of the reverse veto can be easily
remedied by placing in the original resolution a time frame or a
provision that states that only a majority vote is needed to end
an action.
D. Increasing Participation Decision Making Process
Compared to other areas, agreement on reform measures to
allow increased participation in the Security Council's decision-
making process is less controversial and agreement has been
easier to achieve among U.N. Members. The Working Group
has also made relatively important steps in this area.
1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups
Several proposals have been made by Member States.
These proposals include the following: the Security Council
should hear the views of pertinent non-members of the Security
Council when it is considering substantive matters; a non-mem-
ber should be able to meet with the President of the Security
Council when the non-member's interests are affected; the Se-
curity Council should fully implement Articles 31, 32 and 50 of
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the Charter and Rules 37 and 38 of the Security Council's Provi-
sional Rules of Procedure; the Security Council should consult
on a regular and timely basis not only with the countries af-
fected by Security Council decisions, but with concerned re-
gional groups and organizations; the Security Council should
invite non-members to its discussions; and the agenda for infor-
mal consultations should be circulated. 137
2. Working Group's Proposals
The Working Group's proposals are similar to those of the
Member States. It has stated that the views of non-members of
the Security Council should be heard and consulted more fre-
quently; that the Security Council should not challenge non-
members' request to be heard, but should comply with Article
31, 32 and 50 of the Charter and Rules 37 and 38 of the Security
Council's Rules; and that the President of the Security Council
should promptly meet with the non-members whose interests
are urgently affected. 13s
3. Author's Proposals
No United Nations organ, especially the Council, must become so
complex as to preclude a category of State from participation.
Wisdom, like democratic rights, should be widely shared. There
must be full access to the distilled experiences of the weak, the
poor and the small. 139
Increasing the participation of Member States in the Secur-
ity Council's decision-making process is yet another way to pro-
vide equality and representation of the entire U.N.
Membership. The Security Council must consult with Member
States whose interests are directly affected before making deci-
sions or passing resolutions that will affect such countries.
Mandating direct consultations will not affect the ability of the
137 See Relationship between the Security Council and other Principal organs of
the United Nations U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1999/CRP.4 (1999), revised by U.N. Doc. A/
53/47/Annex V(1999); United Nations Reforms. African Common Position, supra
note 132.
138 See 1999 Working Group Report, supra note 88, at 14.
139 U.N. Doc. A1AC.247/5 (1995), revised by Question of Equitable Representa-
tion o and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and related Matter,
U.N. GAOR, 49' Sess., agenda Item 33, at 71, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/49/965 (1995)
(Report from Belize to the Working Group).
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Security Council to act promptly. With the telecommunications
technology presently available throughout the world, time effi-
ciency is no longer a pertinent issue in this respect.
The General Assembly should amend Article 31 of the
Charter to provide mandatory, rather than discretionary, par-
ticipation by affected Member States. This would entail chang-
ing the language of the Article from "may participate" to "shall
participate."140 Since this is a less controversial area, the Per-
manent Members most likely will not veto this amendment.
The General Assembly could alternatively pass a resolution
stating that affected countries should be consulted and have an
opportunity to be heard before a Security Council resolution is
passed.
A related problem that should be addressed is the insuffi-
ciency of consulting with the Member States alone. One of the
difficulties of only consulting with Member States is that it au-
tomatically gives a reigning government an advantage. In civil
strife, the opposition would not have the privilege of attending
Security Council consultations. The situation surrounding
Rwanda can again be used as an example. During 1994 alone,
members of two diametrically different governments repre-
sented Rwanda at different times: the Hutu and the Tutsi-lead
governments. 141 The Hutu government had originally placed
its representative in the Security Council. 14 2 Later, the Tutsi
government replaced that Security Council representative.
During the time when resolutions concerning Rwanda were be-
ing passed, therefore, the Security Council was consulting with
either one side or the other. This probably hindered the process
of understanding the complete truth of the then-current events
in Rwanda, and affected the path taken by the Security Council.
To halt future similar occurrences, the General Assembly
should also pass a resolution providing that the Security Coun-
cil will not only consult with the Member States, but also vari-
ous representatives within a single State such as Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO's).
140 See U.N. CHARTER art. 31.
141 The Case for a new interpretation of Article 31 of the Charter of the United
Nations, paper by the Czech Republic, U.N. Doc. AIAC.24W/1996/CRP.13 (1996), re-
vised by U.N. GAOR 50 Sess., supp. No. 47, Add.1, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/50/47/
Add.l/Annex X (1996).
142 See id.
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E. Increasing Transparency
Consensus seemed to have emerged on the need for greater trans-
parency in the Council's work, which would imbue it with greater
democracy and accountability... It would also encourage the ma-
jority of Member States to render their full support and contrib-
ute to the work of the Council through more active
participation. 143
1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups
Reform proposals pertaining to transparency have been
sparse, and debate has been rare by the Member States re-
gional groups. Yet, there is a general consensus that the se-
crecy of Security Council meetings should be eradicated, and
that they should be held in public. Surprisingly, one permanent
member has proposed suggestions for greater transparency.
France recommended that the Security Council should open its
sessions more frequently to all U.N. Members with only certain
limitations for timely concerns. 144 The French proposal also in-
cluded adding two new instances in which the Security Council
should meet in public: 1) orientation debates when the Security
Council is preparing to begin consideration of an important
question; and 2) public exchanges of views between Members of
the Security Council. 145
2. Working Group's Proposals
The Working Group suggested several practices which can
increase transparency of the Security Council.' 46 Some of these
"suggested improvements" include:
a) The Security Council should conduct its business in a public
format open to all member States of the United Nations; .. .c)
143 See Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83. "It is imperative
that the debate on Security Council reform should conform to the principle of abso-
lute transparency. Transparency was the best way to involve all the Member
States and ensure that their ideas would be heard equitably and fairly." (State-
ment by representative of Qatar). Id.
144 See Letter dated 9 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/49/
667-S/1994/1279, at 2, 5-6 (1994).
145 See id.
146 See 1999 Working Group Report, supra note 88, at 11-17.
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The Security Council should hold substantive orientation debates
open to all Member States at the beginning of its consideration of
any substantive matter; d) The Security Council should, more
often, conduct open debates and orientation discussions on the im-
portant items at the ministerial level"; Immediately following
meetings between Security Council members, troop-contributing
countries, other contributors and the Secretariat, the President
should brief interested non-members of the Security Council on
the contents of such meetings. 147
The Working Group, however, also stated that "[wihen it so
decides, the Security Council may meet in private and/or con-
duct its business in consultations as a whole." 148 Essentially,
this nullifies all of the suggested improvements by permitting
the Security Council to hold private meetings at its discretion.
3. Author's Proposals
While the great majority of the Security Council's work is
accomplished in private, informal consultations, such consulta-
tions are not mentioned in either the U.N. Charter or in the
Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure. Rule 48
states that meetings "shall" be held in public "unless it decides
otherwise." 49 The Security Council itself should delete the
wording "unless it decides otherwise" and create an objective
standard pertaining to when private meetings can be held.
These meetings should only be held in limited circumstances.
Previously, the Security Council did most of its work in public
meetings and provided verbatim records of these meetings. The
Security Council should return to this system. As mentioned
above, the resolutions and subsequent actions surrounding
Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are considered to be the great-
est failures of the Security Council. These were formulated al-
most entirely in private sessions with only a formal show of
hands in public sessions. If the Security Council itself will not
change this rule of procedures, then the General Assembly
should pass a resolution to require public meetings and to clar-
ify the circumstances in which private meetings may be held.
147 Id. at 11-14.
148 Id.
149 Rules of Procedure, supra note 65, at Rule 48.
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F. Other Proposals to Increase Equality and Representation
1. Shifting Power to the General Assembly
Beyond the specific proposals discussed above, a means to
significantly increase representation and equality of U.N. Mem-
ber States is to shift power from the Security Council to the
General Assembly. The General Assembly is inherently more
equitable and representative for several reasons. It is composed
of one representative from each Member State, each Member
State having one vote. 150 A two-thirds majority is required to
pass its resolutions of importance, and all other issues require
only a simple majority. 15 1 No single State has the power to veto
any action.' 52
The idea of placing more power with the General Assembly
was mentioned at the San Francisco Conference. At the time,
the smaller powers throughout the world were concerned that
the Security Council would possess unyielding power. Sugges-
tions were made in an attempt to curtail the Security Council's
authority. These included associating the General Assembly
with the Security Council in terms of its enforcement decisions
and giving the General Assembly authority to judge the Secur-
ity Council's actions. 15 3 These ideas were found unacceptable
by the Five Powers and were rejected. 5 4 The inherent obstacle
of transferring power to the General Assembly is, once again,
dependent on the Security Council's acceptance.
Several methods can be utilized to achieve a transfer of
power from the Security Council to the General Assembly.
First, an attempt can be made to pass amendments to the Char-
ter in accordance with the proposals suggested above. Some
amendments concerning the less controversial areas will be eas-
ier to pass and the Permanent Members will be less likely to
reject them. The Charter has only been amended three times in
the past. It was amended in 1965 to increase the size of the
Security Council from eleven to fifteen. Two subsequent
amendments were passed to expand the Economic and Social
150 See BAsic FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIoNs, supra note 17, at 6-7.
151 See id. Resolutions of importance include those concerning peace and se-
curity, admission of new Members and budgetary matters. See id.
152 See id.
153 See Kirgis, supra note 49, at 508.
154 See id.
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Council from eighteen to twenty-seven and later to fifty-four. 155
These amendments were the result of pressure from U.N. Mem-
ber States complaining that the composition of these two organs
did not reflect the entire United Nations.156 This method of in-
creased pressure can also function today to pass amendments
reforming the Security Council.
Second, de facto amendments to the Charter can be passed
to decrease the Security Council's power and shift it to the As-
sembly. De facto amendments are accomplished through the
resolution process. 5 7 These resolutions are in no way binding
under the terms of the Charter. Yet, in the past they have been
accepted and adhered to by the Security Council. For example,
a de facto amendment was made to the Charter permitting the
General Assembly to make recommendations despite the fact
that the Security Council had seized the problem. The Security
Council did not raise objections to this resolution.
The General Assembly has also rendered de facto amend-
ments that directly changed the working methods of the Secur-
ity Council. For example, the General Assembly was able to
remove the so-called "double veto" that the Permanent Mem-
bers once possessed.158 The double veto occurred when the Se-
curity Council was making a preliminary determination as to
whether an issue was procedural or substantive. Since the veto
cannot be used on purely procedural matters, a permanent
member would use its veto declaring the matter to be substan-
tive when, in fact, it was procedural. 59 After it was deemed
substantive, the same country could later veto any decision. If
that same issue had been deemed procedural, the veto could not
have been invoked on the decision. 6 0 China, the Soviet Union,
155 See Willson, supra note 79, at 117. (citing GA Res. 1991A (XVIII), U.N.
GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/55 (1963); GA Res. 2101 (XX),
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), GA Res.
1991B (XVII), U.N. Doc. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1963); GA Res. 2847 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 67, U.N.
Doc. A/8429 (1971)).
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 Kirgis, supra note 49, at 510; see also generally Leo Gross, The Double Veto
and the Four-Power Statement on Voting in the Security Council, 67 HAIv. L. REv.
251 (1953).
159 See id.
160 See id.
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the United States and the United Kingdom all favored this
double veto. 161 But, in 1949, the Assembly adopted a resolution
containing an affirmative list of categories deemed procedural
and essentially terminated the double veto. 162 The Security
Council accepted the resolution and never used the double veto
again. 163 This demonstrates that while the General Assembly's
resolutions are not actually binding on the Security Council, the
Security Council has accepted and implemented General As-
sembly resolutions. The Security Council has accepted and
most likely will continue to accept other de facto amendments.
The General Assembly should, therefore, pass resolutions,
as de facto amendments or otherwise, related to the specific pro-
posals and other problems discussed above. For example, to ad-
dress the problem of lack of "checks and balances" the General
Assembly should pass a resolution to the effect that the Secur-
ity Council must take into consideration past ICJ decisions in
its future proceedings. This will be more efficient than involv-
ing the ICJ while the Security Council is in the process of decid-
ing an issue. If the Security Council must hold its decision-
making process to obtain an interlocutory decision, it will be im-
possible for the Security Council to fulfill its mandate to act
with promptness. Further, applying the ICJ's decisions retroac-
tively would not be timely or relevant.
Third, correcting the problem of the Security Council's ex-
clusive power when it has seized a matter can also be accom-
plished through resolutions. As stated above, the General
Assembly can pass resolutions on issues that the Security
Council has seized. It should continue to use this method with
more frequency to voice the opinion of the entire Assembly, if its
opinion does vary from that of the Security Council. Further,
the General Assembly should consider passing a resolution to
formulate a list of circumstances in which the Security Council
is permitted to seize a matter solely, and the situations in which
it is prohibited from doing so. In the latter case, the Security
Council must act jointly with the General Assembly.
161 See id. (citing U.N. Doe. 852, III11/37(1), 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 710, 714
(1945)).
162 See id. (citing U.N. Doc. A/900, at 7 (1949)).
163 See id.
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Fourth, although this article discusses action rather than
inaction of the Security Council, a means of increasing the
power of Assembly in the event of inaction should be mentioned.
If the Security Council fails to act, power can be shifted to the
General Assembly with the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" (the
"Resolution"). 64 This Resolution was adopted in 1950 by an
overwhelming majority vote of fifty-two to five with two absten-
tions.165 This Resolution provides:
If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the perma-
nent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in any case
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider
the matter immediately . .. 166
This Resolution has seldom been used, but it can be a very
effective tool for empowering the Assembly. It effectively trans-
fers Security Council issues to the General Assembly in the
event that action is blocked in the Security Council by a veto.
The Resolution has been used to address issues surrounding the
Suez Crisis, Hungary, Lebanon and Jordan, the Congo, and
Israel. 167 The Resolution can also be used to invoke an "emer-
gency special session" of the Assembly to be convened within
twenty-four hours. Ten of these sessions have been con-
vened.' 68 The legality of the resolution was contested by the
Soviet Union, but in 1962 the ICJ ruled that the Resolution was
based on a lawful interpretation of the Charter. 169
The potential value of this Resolution has not been recog-
nized. A past example in which the Resolution could have been
164 U.N. Doc. GA/RES/377(V) (1950).
165 See 1950 U.N. Y.B. 181-195.
166 U.N. Doc. GA/RES/377(V), (1950). The motive for passing this resolution
was the realization that the action in North Korea had only been possible because
the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council when the Korean War
started. See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 229.
167 See BAILEY, supra note 11, at 461.
168 See http'//www.un.orgIOverview/Organs/emspss.html. The sessions were
held on the following dates and topics: 1) Nov. 1956, Middle East; 2) Nov. 1956,
Hungary; 3) Aug. 1958, Middle East; 4) Sept. 1960, Congo; 5) Sept. 1967, Middle
East; 6) Jan. 1980, Afghanistan; 7) July 1980, Palestine; 8) Sept. 1981, Namibia; 9)
Jan. 1982, Occupied Arab territories; 10) April 1997, Occupied East Jerusalem and
the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
169 See VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 9, at 64.
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used was when the Security Council failed to act in response to
the Argentinean-British conflict over the Falklands
(Malvinas). 170 A resolution to force an immediate cease-fire and
to seek a diplomatic solution failed as a result of vetoes by Great
Britain and the United States. 171 According to the Charter,
Great Britain, as a party to the dispute, should have been dis-
qualified from voting. The United States representative also
stated that if it were possible, it would have changed its veto to
an abstention. 17 2 In this situation, the General Assembly could
have invoked the Resolution to force a cease-fire more rapidly.
More recently, the General Assembly could have used the Reso-
lution in Kosovo. The Resolution should be used in more situa-
tions because it allows the General Assembly and all Member
States to actively participate.
The powers created by the U.N. must be shifted away from
the Security Council and placed with the General Assembly.
This can be accomplished by passing amendments to the Char-
ter, de facto amendments, resolutions in general, declarations,
and by using already available resolutions with more frequency.
With continued and increased pressure from the U.N. Member
States, these methods can accomplish Security Council reform.
2. Finalizing Provisional Rules
The Security Council's lack of adherence to its own Provi-
sional Rules of Procedure must be addressed. Although the
Charter was adopted over fifty-five years ago, these rules have
never been finalized. The Security Council, therefore, can and
does depart from the rules when it deems necessary. 173 The
Procedures of the Security Council must be finalized immedi-
ately. The term "Provisional" must be deleted, and these proce-
dures must be followed. Finally, any General Assembly
resolutions pertaining to the Security Council's working meth-
170 Although this is a not a recent example, it most clearly demonstrates the
blatant abuse of the Security Council's powers.
171 MCWHINNEY, supra note 9, at 220-21.
172 See id. at 221. After the vote the then-representative of the United States,
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, stated that she had been requested by her government to
make this statement. Apparently the retrieval in position surrounded the impend-
ing resignation of the Secretary of State Haig who had consistently favored the
British. See id.
173 See Aust, supra note 66, at 365.
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ods should be incorporated into the rules of procedure rather
than making mere "gentlemen's agreements" as is now the
norm.
3. Time Frame
Ideally, a specific date, a date of some anniversary, should
be set as a deadline for the completion of Security Council re-
form measures. At one point, the year 2000 had been estab-
lished as the deadline to accomplish reform. Yet, the year 2000
will come and go before any reforms are invoked. Instead of de-
termining a specific year or date for the completion of Security
Council reform, measures should be accomplished in segments.
The General Assembly should not wait for all reform issues to
be resolved before reforming the Security Council. Rather, it
should focus on one issue at a time, resolve it, and take the nec-
essary steps to implement the change. As stated above, in-
creased participation is not as controversial an issue as the
others and, therefore, it could be addressed before more contro-
versial issues.
Concerning the Working Group, rather than approving its
mandate to continue its work, the General Assembly should cre-
ate a certain time frame mandating its completion of proposals.
This time frame could also include the order of issues to be
presented. The Working Group has produced modest progress
within the past seven years of its existence. After such a time
elapse, the Working Group should be beyond simply stating is-
sues such as "Can we agree that every endeavor should be made
to explore the possibility of Security Council enlargement?" The
General Assembly, therefore, should not approve the Working
Groups' own recommendations that it continue its work.
Through the use of political pressure, amendments, and
resolution procedures, the General Assembly must immediately
begin to reform the Security Council step-by-step. The General
Assembly should create an agenda during the year 2001 that
states which issues of reform will be addressed and in which
order. Subsequently, starting in the official new millennium,
the General Assembly must tackle these issues.
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V. CONCLUSION
Security Council reform would be durable and fruitful only if it
fully reflected the principles of sovereign equality of Member
States, equitable geographical distribution and democratization.
Developing countries must have adequate representation, taking
into account the fact that most of the issues under the Council's
authority took place in, or were of vital interest to, the developing
world.174
The United Nations Security Council was created during
World War II. Since its creation, both the political and eco-
nomic climate has changed significantly. The Security Council
must reflect on the political realities of the twenty-first century,
not that of post-World War II. As the new millennium contin-
ues, it is most likely that the activities of the Security Council
will continue to increase. Although it has been argued that the
Security Council has finally arrived at its intended state, by
achieving concerted international action to remedy situations
throughout the world, the Security Council has faltered in the
manner in which it has approached its activities. The Charter
provides that the Security Council's action will be directed for
the benefit of the entire membership; not only for a select few,
and that equality must be afforded to all Member States. These
fundamental principles have been and continue to be ignored,
thus resulting in the demands for reform by the vast majority of
Member States.
To summarize the specific proposals, the permanent mem-
bership of the Security Council should be expanded to include
seats for the African, Arab, Asian, and Latin Groups, and the
overall membership should be increased to twenty-five mem-
bers. The result would be the continued inclusion of the Perma-
nent Members China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and
United States; new representation by the regional groups; and a
remainder of sixteen seats to be divided on the grounds of equi-
table representation for the different regions of the world.
Modifications or limitations should be invoked against the
veto power, such as requiring a two votes veto or limiting its use
to Chapter VII issues, leading to the eventual abolishment of
174 Debate on Security Council Reform, supra note 83 (statement by the
Vietnamese representative).
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the veto. Furthermore, the General Assembly should amend
Article 31 of the Charter to provide mandatory rather than dis-
cretionary participation of interested Member States. Pertain-
ing to its private meetings, the Security Council itself should
delete the wording "unless it decides otherwise" and create an
objective standard describing when private meetings shall be
held. If the Security Council itself does not change this proce-
dural rule, the General Assembly should pass a resolution to
mandate public meetings.
Beyond these specific proposals, any Security Council re-
form measures, ultimately, will depend on the General Assem-
bly as a whole and on all the U.N. Member States individually,
particularly the Permanent Member's continuous pressure on
the Security Council. The majority of the Member States
should not act hypocritically by calling for reforms, and at the
same time yielding to the desires of the powerful Member
States. Unfortunately, the mechanisms installed over fifty
years ago bestowed incredible power upon the Security Council,
including giving the Permanent Members the right to approve
any changes. Thus, the General Assembly must first attempt to
pass amendments, and, if unsuccessful, the General Assembly
must then pass resolutions, which the Security Council can
adopt and in many instances will adopt in practice.
The U.N. and the Security Council cannot continue into the
new millennium in their present state. Considering the availa-
bility of such great force, the decision to use the powers of the
U.N. should not be left to the prerogative of the few Permanent
Members. The world has seen an incredible increase in Secur-
ity Council activities in the 1990's, an increase that will most
likely continue. The Security Council's activities should not be
permitted to continue in the absence of representation and
equality for all U.N. Member States.
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